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 Small acquirers experience greater abnormal returns upon acquisition 
announcements (other things equal) than large acquirers.  In efficient markets, the 
persistence of differential abnormal returns over time and across industries would imply 
that shareholder wealth effects of corporate acquisitions diminish as firms grow, possibly 
due to greater agency problems at large firms.   
 The evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
differential market response is related to limits to arbitrage, rather than differential value 
creation among small and large acquirers.  I find a difference in abnormal announcement 
returns only in acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets: events that are interpreted by 
the market as positive news.  My results suggest that announcements made by small 
acquirers are associated with costlier short sales and larger abnormal trading volume 
resulting in greater temporary price pressure.   
 The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that large acquirers’ overpayment 
for the target and/or greater operating synergies by small acquirers explain the size effect 
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 The empirical finance literature reports an interesting puzzle: small public firms’ 
acquisition announcements create greater size adjusted shareholder value than those of 
large public firms (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)).  Firm size is a statistically 
and economically significant independent variable in several event study regressions of 
shareholder gains even when controls are employed for deal and firm characteristics 
(Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005), Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006), Masulis, 
Cong, and Xie (2007), Offenberg (2009), Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012)). 
 This paper explores the sources of differential abnormal returns among small and 
large acquirers.  In efficient markets, abnormal stock returns around corporate events 
reflect the event’s impact on shareholder wealth, as long as the event is unanticipated 
(Brown and Warner (1980)).  If markets are efficient, the empirical result that small 
acquirers’ announcements consistently generate greater abnormal stock returns than those 
of large acquirers suggests that – other things equal – shareholders are better off because 
the acquisition increases the fundamental value of the firm to a greater extent.  This 
explanation would be consistent with The Nature of the Firm.  Coase’s seminal paper 
(1937) suggests that an optimal firm size exists where the marginal cost of production 
utilizing internal coordination is equal to that of employing the external price mechanism.   
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The Coasian explanation of the size effect in shareholder gains suggests that acquisition 
announcements made by firms below the optimal size (small firms) generate more size 
adjusted shareholder wealth than acquisitions by firms above the optimal size (large firms), 
because the former has a greater potential for enhancing profitability by growth via 
acquisitions.  As firms grow, profits eventually fail to keep up with the number and 
complexity of management tasks due to diminishing returns to management.   
 In contrast, if market efficiency is distorted by investors’ tendency to overreact to 
news, then differential abnormal returns can arise from greater overreaction when short-
selling constraints prevent arbitrageurs from mitigating excessive price movements.  Short-
selling restrictions exclude investors with pessimistic valuations from the trading pool 
(Miller (1977)) and allow optimistic investors to bid up the stock price to higher levels in 
response to positive news.  The extent of mispricing is even greater in the presence of noise 
traders (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990)) whose activities amplify the 
bullish signal.   
 The behavioral explanation suggests that the size effect in acquisition gains arises 
from the tendency of the market to overreact to news (DeBondt and Thaler (1994)) and 
limits to arbitrage (Barberis and Thaler (2003), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).  Behavioral 
finance would argue that when the acquisition is interpreted as positive news by the market, 
stocks with costlier arbitrage – such as the shares of small acquirers – will experience a 
greater positive overreaction, because costly short sales deter arbitrageurs from taking 
contrarian positions around the event.   
 This paper presents empirical results for testing the Coasian and the behavioral 





 I employ two measures of firm size: a categorical variable that accommodates 
industry variation in optimal firm size by classifying an acquirer as “small” if its total assets 
fall at or below 40th percentile of the industry asset distribution and “large” if its total assets 
fall at or above the 60th percentile, and the log of the acquirer’s total assets as a second 
measure of acquirer size.  In order to exclude the impact of variation around the mean on 
the results, these tests exclude acquirers whose asset size is between the 40th and the 60th 
percentiles of the industry-year median. 
 Next, I investigate how the impact of acquirer size on shareholder gains varies by 
the organizational form of the target and the form of payment.  The results suggest that the 
difference in abnormal returns between small and large acquirers’ announcements prevails 
only in acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets.  These announcements are good news 
to the market:  they generate significantly positive shareholder gains.  Mean (median) 
three-day abnormal returns are 1.9% (0.9%) in all acquisitions of private and subsidiary 
targets, 3.8% (1.7%) among small firms, and 1.0% (0.7%) among large firms.  Shareholder 
gains do not differ significantly among small and large acquirers in acquisitions of public 
targets that generate significantly negative announcement abnormal returns.  
 I assess the empirical validity of the Coasian explanation from two perspectives: 
the economic efficiency of acquisition decisions and overpayment for the target firm.  If 
an optimal range of firm size exists, then firms below the optimal range are likely to have 
greater potential to increase productivity by growing via acquisitions, hence their 
acquisition decisions can create greater fundamental shareholder value.   
 I gauge fundamental shareholder value creation by two metrics:  the change in 





sales growth in the two postmerger fiscal years relative to the two premerger fiscal years.  
Univariate results show that small acquirers experience better operating efficiency and 
greater sales growth than large acquirers.  However, postmerger efficiency gains become 
statistically insignificant in multivariate event study regressions with three-day abnormal 
returns as the dependent variable, while the impact of acquirer size persists.  These findings 
suggest that differences in postmerger efficiency gains do not explain the effect of acquirer 
size on shareholder gains.   
 Another plausible hypothesis of lower announcement abnormal returns 
accompanying acquisition announcements at large firms is managerial hubris.  Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find that large acquirers pay greater deal premiums for 
their targets.  Deal premium is calculated as total deal value over the target firm’s market 
capitalization prior to the acquisition announcement, hence it is restricted to transactions 
where the target is a publicly listed firm.  Since acquisitions of public targets differ from 
acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets along several dimensions, the extrapolation 
of this measure is not straightforward.  A high deal premium could arise either because the 
bidder pays a greater excess amount over the target’s fair market value for controlling the 
target’s assets or because the target’s equity is temporarily undervalued by the market, but 
the target’s shareholders negotiate a price that reflects the higher long-term valuation.  The 
deal premium may also be affected by differences in the capital structure of the target firm 
as the acquirer takes over not only the target’s assets but also its debt.  For example, if the 
target has high leverage, the final merger agreement between the acquirer and the target 
may specify that some of the funds are used by the target to repay outstanding debt to 





 I introduce a novel measure for the target premium that is available for private and 
subsidiary targets and is not affected by the target’s capital structure: the change in acquirer 
goodwill as a fraction of total deal value.  FASB Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standard 141(R) on Business Combinations requires acquirers to record the excess 
payment over the fair value of net assets (i.e. assets minus liabilities), as goodwill1 .  
 Estimation of fair market values, and recording the excess as goodwill, is subject 
to stringent audit requirements.  Hence, if a large fraction of the compensation is recorded 
as goodwill, it implies that the acquirer paid a substantial premium for the target either in 
expectation of substantial match-specific synergies or owing to managerial hubris.     
 The results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the effect of acquirer size on 
shareholder gains would be related to the target premium.  Although univariate tests show 
that acquirers tend to pay greater premiums for their targets, the impact ceases to be 
significant in multivariate regressions of shareholder gains on deal and firm characteristics.  
Further, controlling for the target premium does not affect the coefficient on acquirer size 
in multivariate event study regressions.  Hence, the acquirer size effect on shareholder 
gains does not arise from differences in overpayment for the target. 
 Next, I explore the validity of the behavioral explanation of the effect of acquirer 
size on value creation, in particular the relationship between limits to arbitrage and the size 
effect in acquisition gains.   
                                                          
1 Paragraph 34 of SFAS 141(R) states: 
“The acquirer shall recognize goodwill as of the acquisition date, measured as the excess of (a) over (b) 
below:  
a. The aggregate of: (1) The consideration transferred measured in accordance with this Statement, which 
generally requires acquisition-date fair value (paragraph 39) (2) The fair value of any noncontrolling interest 
in the acquiree (3) In a business combination achieved in stages, the acquisition-date fair value of the 
acquirer’s previously held equity interest in the acquiree. 
b. The net of the acquisition-date amounts of the identifiable assets acquired and the liabilities assumed 





 Behavioral finance argues that agents in financial markets are not fully rational 
(Barberis and Thaler (2003) provide an excellent review of the literature).  In markets 
populated by both rational and irrational traders, the trading activities of irrational noise 
traders may lead to mispricing of the securities.  Rational agents’ trading decisions may 
not correct such mispricing in the short-term due to arbitrage implementation costs and 
noise trader risk. 
 Antweiler and Frank (2006) examine how stock prices react to positive and 
negative news.  They document a significant predictable drift in stock prices starting two 
days after the news event in the opposite direction from the original market reaction to the 
news.  The typical reaction to news stories is a prompt strong jump in stock prices followed 
by a gradual reversal.  This reversal implies that the market tends to overreact to news 
events.      
 I hypothesize that the magnitude of market overreaction to news – relative to the 
price adjustment justified by the new information – depends on the efficiency of the price 
formation process.   
 Since the price efficiency of stocks that face short-selling constraints is lower than 
those that do not face short-selling constraints (Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), Boehmer and 
Wu (2013)), I conjecture that the positive news carried by the acquisition announcement 
induces a larger overreaction in the case of shares with limited short-selling. 
 Short-selling limitations cannot be measured directly, because the volume of short 
positions that would prevail if short-selling was freely available, is unobservable.  I gauge 
short-selling constraints by the idiosyncratic volatility of the acquirer’s shares based on 





cost faced by arbitrageurs that discourages rational traders from taking short positions.   
 My results indicate that announcements made by acquirers whose shares are subject 
to greater short-selling constraints generate significantly greater short-term abnormal 
returns than those that are not, regardless of the size of the firm.  I also find that 
announcements of acquirers with costly short sales are accompanied by significantly 
greater abnormal trading volume (calculated following Bamber (1987)) and lower short 
interest in the three event days.  Greater abnormal returns for acquirers with costly short-
sales are followed by greater subsequent reversals, providing further support for the 
overreaction hypothesis. 
 A steady pattern emerges from the data: as the market responds to the good news 
of the acquirer’s announcement to buy a private or subsidiary target, shares with costlier 
short sales respond with greater abnormal trading turnover.  The buying pressure leads to 
greater abnormal returns followed by correspondingly larger reversals in the subsequent 
month.   
 As a final test, I introduce a control for the cost of short-selling, proxied by the 
idiosyncratic volatility of the acquirer’s shares to the event study regressions of shareholder 
gains on firm and deal characteristics.  The results indicate that the coefficient on 
idiosyncratic volatility subsumes the effect of acquirer size in the regressions and improves 
the overall fit.  
 I conclude that the impact of acquirer size on shareholder gains in corporate 
acquisitions reflects investor overreaction associated with costly short sales limiting 
arbitrage.  Although fundamental differences exist among small and large acquirers, these 





 My paper makes contributions to the literature on the relationship between market 
frictions and shareholder gains in corporate events.  First, my results document that the 
effect of firm size on shareholder gains in event studies is driven by limits to arbitrage.  
This finding has an important implication: short-selling constraints play a statistically 
significant role in measured event study returns.  Failing to control for this market friction 
may lead to biased coefficients on other independent variables and a misinterpretation of 
the evidence regarding shareholder gains.   
 My results also provide direct evidence on the link between short-selling constraints 
and market overreaction to good news.  Miller (1977) establishes that short-selling tends 
to moderate the tendency of the stock price to be bid up to higher levels as it allows 
investors with pessimistic views to trade on their valuation.  My results attest to Miller’s 
argument and show that the initial overreaction to good news in the case of shares with 
costly short sales is associated with greater abnormal buying pressure and it is followed by 
larger reversals.  
 Finally, my results clarify that the effect of acquirer size on shareholder gains in 
acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets is independent from systematic differences in 
postmerger efficiency gains, or the degree of overpayment for the target’s assets.      
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 provides a review of the 
literature that forms the context of my study.  Chapter 3 describes the sample and reports 
how shareholder gains differ along firm size and the organizational form of the target.  





 My dissertation makes contributions to the literature on corporate acquisitions and 
the relationship between market frictions and event study results.   
 The corporate finance literature recognizes that firm size is a significant determiant 
of abnormal returns in acquisition events.  Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) 
document that the wealth of small acquirers’ shareholders increases by about 2% more than 
that of large acquirers in three days surrounding acquisition announcements.  Their findings 
indicate that large acquirers pay higher deal premiums for public targets, leading to the 
interpretation that overpayment for the target makes large firm’s acquisition decisions less 
efficient, resulting in lower shareholder gains upon the announcement.  In studies 
examining the role of corporate governance in shareholder value creation Masulis, Wang, 
and Xie (2007), Offenberg (2009), Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006), and Harford, 
Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012) report negative coefficients on firm size in 
multivariate regressions of shareholder gains.  Intuitively, if small acquirers’ acquisitions 
were more efficient, then these firms would experience better postmerger economic 
performance leading to higher operating earnings and improved stock returns.  However, 
Ben-David and Roulstone (2008) report that calendar time portfolios formed of small 





postmerger period, and this underperformance is particularly strong among stock-financed 
acquisitions.  I find that differential shareholder gains among small and large acquirers 
arise in acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets.  Acquisition announcement 
shareholder gains do not differ significantly in acquisitions of public targets. 
 My results indicate that the effect of acquirer size on shareholder gains is 
independent from postmerger efficiency gains and the overpayment for the target firm.  
Univariate results show that large acquirers tend to pay greater target premiums and incur 
lower postefficiency gains than small acquirers.  However, the controls for the target 
premium and changes in postmerger performance are statistically insignificant in 
multivariate event study regressions and do not affect the magnitude and significance of 
the coefficient on acquirer size, implying that the size effect arises from other sources.   
 The paper also contributes to the behavioral finance literature on providing 
evidence that limits to arbitrage contribute to market overreaction, leading to temporary 
mispricing of securities.  Miller (1977) shows that short-selling constraints induce an 
upward bias in the equilibrium price by excluding pessimistic traders’ views from the price 
formation process.  De Long et al. (1990) model how the unpredictability of noise traders’ 
beliefs can make arbitrage ineffective and deter smart money arbitrageurs from driving the 
stock price to the stock’s fundamental value in the short-term.  In analyzing the closed-end 
fund discount, Pontiff (1996) documents that idiosyncratic risk is the largest cost of holding 
a security and it is strongly related to the level of mispricing.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
model how specialized arbitrageurs are discouraged from taking positions in securities with 
high idiosyncratic risk if short-selling requires resources for maintaining a risky margin 





weights to securities with high idiosyncratic risk even if their capital is not limited, 
therefore these securities are more prone to mispricing.  Ang et al. (2006) find a strong 
negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and average returns.  Using short-
rebate fees to estimate short-selling costs, Drechsler and Drechsler (2014) document that 
stocks that are expensive to short carry a premium net of the short-selling fees and capture 
a substantial fraction of anomaly returns.   
 I document that short-selling limitations have a substantial impact on abnormal 
returns in event studies when the event is associated with stock price increases.  
Specifically, my results provide empirical evidence in support of Miller (1977) and De 
Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) that short-selling limitations induce a 
market overreaction followed by a corresponding reversal as the price gradually adjusts to 








 My sample includes completed mergers and acquisitions of US targets between 
1988 and 2014 from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database matched to CRSP and 
Compustat.  Targets are restricted to public companies, private companies, and subsidiaries 
of public companies.  I require CRSP return information for the year preceding the 
acquisition announcement and Compustat data for at least five fiscal years:  the effective 
fiscal year of the acquisition and two preceding and two subsequent fiscal years.  I set the 
minimum deal value, defined as the total consideration paid by the acquirer excluding fees 
and related expenses, to $10 million and drop transactions where the deal value relative to 
the market capitalization of the acquirer 11 days before the announcement is less than 1%.  
In order to avoid repeat partial acquisitions, I require that the acquirer controls less than 
50% of the target before the acquisition and obtains 100% ownership.  I exclude 
transactions with missing information on the announcement date, effective date, deal value, 
target organizational form, or payment form.  These procedures result in 8,802 acquisitions.  
I assign acquirers to 48 industry groups defined in Fama and French (1997) based on their 
primary SIC codes in Compustat in the fiscal year of the acquisition.   
 The Coasian theory of the firm implies that the tradeoff between production by 
internal coordination and outsourcing from the market determines a range of optimal firm 
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sizes.  Intuitively, this depends on the nature of core activities:  the optimal asset size is 
larger for firms in heavy manufacturing industries than in service industries.  Hence, I 
classify an acquirer as “small” if its total assets fall at or below the 40th percentile and 
“large” if its total assets fall at or above the 60th percentile of the industry asset distribution.  
In order to avoid potential ambiguity coming from variations around the median, I 
intentionally omit firms from these size categories whose total assets fall between the 40th 
and 60th percentiles.  As a second measure, I employ the log of acquirer total assets as a 
continuous indicator of firm size.   
 Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the sample.  Firm characteristics are 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year of the acquisition announcement. 
 Small and large acquirers do not differ significantly in Tobin’s Q measures 
calculated as the market to book assets ratio defined in Adam and Goyal (2008).  As 
Tobin’s Q proxies for the firm’s growth opportunities, this finding implies that no clear 
relationship exists between a firm’s growth opportunities and its size.  On the other hand, 
small acquirers have lower equity market valuations and lower operating efficiency than 
large acquirers, suggesting a larger scope of potential productivity improvements.   
 In agreement with the literature reporting a negative relationship between firm size 
and financial constraints (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Whited and Wu (2006), 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010)), small acquirers have lower leverage ratios than large 
acquirers.  At the same time, they have greater levels of excess cash measured as cash 
reserves over the predicted industry-year median (as specified in Harford (1999)) 
suggesting that small acquirers have been actively accumulating cash reserves to finance 
acquisition plans.   
14 
 
 Relative deal size, deal value as a fraction of the acquirer’s prior market 
capitalization, is indicative of the economic magnitude of investment.  Given the same net 
present value of an investment, the acquisition of a particular target will result in greater 
size adjusted gains for small acquirers than a large ones (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins 
(1983)).   I find that small acquirers make deals that are of substantially greater relative 
size than those made by large acquirers, implying that greater shareholder value creation is 
partly due to adding larger assets.   
 Private and subsidiary firms constitute a greater fraction of targets chosen by small 
acquirers (88%) than large acquirers (75%).  In light of the greater profitability of these 
acquisitions (Chan (1998), Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006)), I conjecture that this 
difference is a meaningful contributor to greater shareholder value creation.  On the other 
hand, small acquirers tend to finance a greater proportion of their acquisitions by stock 
payment, which could lessen shareholder gains, particularly for cash-rich acquirers (Jensen 
(1988), Harford (1999)).   
 I find substantial differences in the market microstructure characteristics of small 
and large acquirers’ shares.  Small acquirers’ shares are significantly less liquid than those 
of their large peers (Demsetz (1968), Amihud (2002)), and they have greater idiosyncratic 
volatility, which implies costlier short sales (Pontiff (1996) and (2006), Stambagh, Yu, and 
Yuan (2015)).  Following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) I measure idiosyncratic 
volatility as the standard deviation of the daily abnormal returns over the Fama-French 
three-factor model during the 200-day period ending on the sixth day before the acquisition 
announcement using estimation parameters from annual Fama-McBeth regressions.  
Average and median idiosyncratic volatilities of the shares of small acquirers (3.7% and 
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3.2%, respectively) are more than 50% greater than those of large acquirers (2.3% and 
2.0%, respectively).   
 Table 2 shows the analysis of shareholder gains by the organizational form of the 
target and method of payment.  Announcement abnormal returns are measured as three-
day cumulative residuals over the Fama and French three-factor model estimated over a 
200-day period that ends on the sixth day preceding the acquisition news.  Panel A.1 reports 
univariate differences in shareholder gains among small and large acquirers in the three-
day event period surrounding the announcement.  Small acquirers’ announcements 
generate substantially greater announcement returns in the case of private and subsidiary 
targets, but not in the case of public targets.  There are two major differences between 
acquisitions of public and nonpublic targets.  First, acquisitions of private and subsidiary 
targets generate significantly positive announcement returns regardless of the form of 
payment, whereas acquisitions of public targets generate negative announcement returns 
in the case of stock or mixed payment, and just slightly positive returns in the case of cash 
payment.  Consequently, acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets are definitely good 
news to the market, whereas acquisitions of public targets tend to be bad news.  Second, 
announcements of acquisitions of private targets are accompanied by less public 
information than announcements of public targets:  there is lower competition for the target 
firm and negotiations during the bidding process result in greater sharing of information 
between the management and the target firm without public disclosures (Chang (1998)).  
Thus, in the case of private and subsidiary targets, the market recognizes the good news, 
but its information set about the particular drivers of profitability is more limited. 
 Table 3 shows three-day cumulative abnormal announcement returns combined 
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with the twenty-two-day cumulative reversals following the event period.  Interestingly, 
the difference in shareholder gains in the case of private and subsidiary targets prevails 
even after combining shareholder gains in the three-day event period with the twenty-two-
day reversal period. 
 Table 4 presents separate regressions of shareholder gains on acquirer size for 
public, private, and subsidiary target acquisitions.  The findings confirm the results in Table 
3: acquirer size is a significant determinant of shareholder gains in acquisitions of private 
and subsidiary targets, but not in acquisitions of public targets by both tests.  Table 5 
illustrates that these results are robust to using the Hoberg-Phillips textual industry 
classifications based on product-market similarities.  Hence, the impact of acquirer size in 
the overall sample originates from the subsample of acquisitions of private and subsidiary 
targets, which make up 79% of the total number of acquisitions. 
 Table 6 discusses the effect of target choice on shareholder gains holding constant 
the size of the acquirer and relative deal size.  The results document that acquisitions of 
public targets carry bad news and acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets carry good 
news to the market even after controlling for the magnitude of investment and the size of 
the acquiring firm.  Table 7 confirms that these results are robust to using the Hoberg-
Phillips product-market similarity algorithm for industry classifications with 50 industry 







This table contains averages and medians (in parentheses) for the sample.  Acquirers are 
classified small if their total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year of the acquisition are 
at or below the 40th percentile for the industry distribution and large if those are at or above 
the 60th percentile.  Values for t and z statistics (the latter in parentheses) reflect the two-
sided difference in means test and the nonparametric equality-of-medians test for the 
significance of the difference between the high and the low idiosyncratic volatility group.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Firm characteristics reflect values at the beginning of the fiscal year of the acquisition 
announcement.  Relative deal size is measured as total deal value over the acquirer's maket 
capitalization. Excess cash represents deviation of cash holdings from the industry-year 
median prediction following Harford (1999).  Idiosyncratic volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation of daily abnormal returns relative to the Fama-French 3-factor model in 
the 200 day time period ending on the 6th day before the acquisition announcement. 
Illiquidity is measured over the 12 months preceding the acquisition announcement by the 
Amihud measure using monthly average returns and prices.  Variables are winsorized at 






Table 1 continued 
 
 Variable All Small Large 
Signi- 
ficance 
Total assets (USD million) 11,153 222 13,089 *** 
 (990) (88) (1,971) *** 
Market value of equity (USD million) 8,841 257 12,160 *** 
 (1,157) (116) (2,280) *** 
Tobin's Q 2.06 2.03 2.10  
 (1.55) (1.52) (1.58) * 
Market to book equity 3.42 3.21 3.55 *** 
 (2.45) (2.11) (2.59) *** 
Operating return on assets 13.1% 7.8% 14.3% *** 
 (13.4%) (11.9%) (13.7%) *** 
Sales growth 25.6% 23.9% 24.8%  
 (13.3%) (11.9%) (13.1%) *** 
Leverage (Book) 19.7% 15.4% 20.4% *** 
 (16.7%) (7.4%) (17.9%) *** 
Excess cash 0.7% 6.8% -1.2% *** 
 (-1.1%) (1.2%) (-2.0%) *** 
Relative deal size 27.7% 66.6% 18.7% *** 
 (8.5%) (32.6%) (5.3%) *** 
Fraction of cash deals 32.2% 20.6% 34.9% *** 
Fraction of diversifying deals 41.7% 42.3% 42.4%  
Fraction of public targets 21.2% 12.1% 24.8% *** 
Fraction of private targets 42.8% 56.0% 39.2% *** 









    
 Variable All Small Large 
Signi- 
ficance 
Idiosyncratic volatility  2.6% 3.7% 2.3% *** 
 (2.2%) (3.2%) (2.0%) *** 
Illiquidity (Amihud measure) 0.195 1.049 0.032 *** 
 (0.002) (0.060) (0.001) *** 





Summary of Three-Day Cumulative Announcement Abnormal Returns 
This table shows the average and the median three-day cumulative abnormal returns 
estimated using the Fama-French three-factor model over a 200 trading day period starting 
205 trading days before the acquisition announcement. Median values are placed below the 
means in parentheses.  Small acquirers are those whose total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year of the acquisition were at or below the 40th percentile of the industry asset 
distribution in a given fiscal year, whereas large acquirers are those whose total assets were 
at or above the 60th percentile.  If 100% of the consideration for the target took place in 
cash, I classify the transaction as a cash payment transaction, otherwise I classify it as stock 
and mixed payment transaction.  Values for t and z statistics (the latter in parentheses) 
reflect the two-sided difference in means test and the nonparametric equality-of-medians 
test for the significance of the difference between the small and the large group.  ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Abnormal returns 




Table 2 continued 
 
 All Small Large 
Signi- 
ficance 
All Targets, All Payment Forms 1.2% 3.1% 0.7% *** 
 (0.6%) (1.5%) (0.4%) *** 
Number of observations 8,802 1,117 6,306  
All Targets, Cash Payment 1.2% 3.1% 0.9% *** 
 (0.7%) (1.6%) (0.6%) *** 
Number of observations 2,837 230 2,205  
All Targets, Stock Payment 1.2% 3.1% 0.6% *** 
 (0.6%) (1.5%) (0.4%) *** 
Number of observations 5,965 887 4,101  
Public Targets, All Payment Forms -1.1% -1.8% -1.1%  
 (-0.5%) (-0.4%) (-0.5%)  
Number of observations 1,869 136 1,564  
Public Targets, Cash Payment  0.5% 2.0% 0.4%  
 (0.2%) (2.1%) (0.2%) * 
Number of observations 592 20 536  
Public Targets, Stock Payment -1.9% -2.5% -1.8%  
 (-1.3%) (-0.7%) (-1.3%)  




Table 2 continued 
 
 All Small Large 
Signi- 
ficance 
Private and Subsidiary Targets, All Payments 1.9% 3.8% 1.3% *** 
 (0.9%) (1.7%) (0.7%) *** 
Number of observations 6,933 981 4,742  
Private and Subsidiary Targets - Cash Payment 1.4% 3.2% 1.0% *** 
 (0.8%) (1.5%) (0.7%) *** 
Number of observations 2,245 210 1,669  
Private and Subsidiary Targets - Stock payment 2.1% 3.9% 1.5% *** 
 (1.0%) (1.8%) (0.8%) *** 




Summary of Twenty-Five-Day Cumulative Announcement Abnormal Returns 
This table shows the average and the median twenty-five-day cumulative abnormal returns 
estimated using the Fama-French three-factor model over a 200 trading day period starting 
205 trading days before the acquisition announcement. Median values are placed below the 
means in parentheses.  Small acquirers are those whose total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year of the acquisition were at or below the 40th percentile of the industry asset 
distribution in a given fiscal year, whereas large acquirers are those whose total assets were 
at or above the 60th percentile.  If 100% of the consideration for the target took place in 
cash, I classify the transaction as a cash payment transaction, otherwise I classify it as stock 
and mixed payment transaction.  Values for t and z statistics (the latter in parentheses) 
reflect the two-sided difference in means test and the nonparametric equality-of-medians 
test for the significance of the difference between the small and the large group.  ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Abnormal returns 





Table 3 continued 
 
 All Small Large  
All Targets, All Payment Forms -0.47% 0.60% -0.68% *** 
 (-0.25%) (0.49%) (-0.37%) ** 
Number of observations 8,614 1,103 6,306  
All Targets, Cash Payment 0.34% 2.26% -0.03% *** 
 (0.41%) (1.32%) (-0.20%) * 
Number of observations 2,778 227 2,164  
All Targets, Stock Payment -0.87% 0.17% -1.04% ** 
 (-0.54%) (0.29%) (-0.64%) ** 
Number of observations 5,836 876 4,000  
Public Targets, All Payment Forms -2.34% -2.27% -2.00%  
 (-1.59%) (-3.21%) (-1.41%)  
Number of observations 1,827 132 1,528  
Public Targets, Cash Payment  -0.27% -1.43% -0.4%  
 (-0.54%) (-4.98%) (-0.37%) * 
Number of observations 578 19 524  
Public Targets, Stock Payment -3.3% -2.42% -3.03%  
 (-2.49%) (-2.62%) (-2.38%)  
Number of observations 1,249 113 1,004  
Private and Subsidiary Targets, All Payments 0.02% 0.99% -0.25% ** 
 (0.11%) (0.58%) (0.01%) ** 
Number of observations 6,787 971 4,636  
Private and Subsidiary Targets - Cash Pmt 0.50% 2.59% -0.03% *** 
 (0.61) (1.62%) (0.41%) ** 









    
 All Small Large  
Private and Subsidiary Targets - Stock Payment -0.20% 0.55% -0.38%  
 (-0.14%) (0.40%) (-0.26%)  




Announcement Abnormal Returns and Acquirer Size 
with 48 Fama-French Industries 
This table reports the effect of acquirer size on three-day cumulative announcement 
abnormal returns.  Two alternative measures of size are used:  an indicator for small 
acquirers and the log of the acquirer’s total assets.  Three-day CARs are estimated using 
the the Fama-French three-factor model over a 200 trading day period starting 205 trading 
days before the acquisition announcement.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
P-values are included in parentheses.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.   
  
 Public Targets Private Targets Subsidiary Targets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 6.00 3.89 5.71 *** 9.78 *** 0.82  5.56 *** 
 (0.41) (0.56) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.50)  (0.00)  
Small Firm  -0.87  2.48 ***   2.48 ***   
 (0.38)  (0.00)    (0.00)    
Total Assets   0.15   -0.60 ***   -0.63 *** 
  (0.21)   (0.00)    (0.00)  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer Ind FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of Obs 1,700 1,869 3,101  3,770  2,622  3,163  





Announcement Abnormal Returns and Acquirer Size  
with 50 Hoberg-Phillips Product-Market Industries 
This table reports the effect of acquirer size on three-day cumulative announcement 
abnormal returns.  Two alternative measures of size are used:  an indicator for small 
acquirers and the log of the acquirer’s total assets.  Three-day CARs are estimated using 
the Fama-French three-factor model over a 200 trading day period starting 205 trading days 
before the announcement.  Industry categories follow the Hoberg-Phillips (2010) clustering 
based on product-market similarities with 50 categories.  Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level.  P-values are included in parentheses.  ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
  
 Public Targets Private Targets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -2.73 * -5.14 *** 2.12  6.85 *** 
 (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.26)  (0.00)  
Small Firm  -1.41    2.07 ***   
 (0.22)    (0.00)    
Total Assets (Log)   0.24      -0.48 *** 
   (0.11)    (0.00)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 1,386  1,530  2,639  3,216  






Announcement Abnormal Returns and Target Organizational Form 
with 48 Fama-French Industries 
This table shows the relationship between acquisition announcement three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns and the organizational form of the target firm.  All regression 
specifications contain industry and year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level.  P-values are included in parentheses.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 All Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Intercept 3.99 * 2.79  2.43  
 (0.06)  (0.18)  (0.25)  
Public Target Indicator -3.02 ***     
 (0.00)      
Private Target Indicator   0.99 ***   
   (0.00)    
Subsidiary Target Indicator     1.29 *** 
     (0.00)  
Small Firm Indicator 1.23 *** 1.59 *** 1.93 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Relative Deal Size  1.46 *** 1.06 *** 0.97 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.02)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 7,423  7,423  7,423  







Announcement Abnormal Returns and Target Organizational Form  
with 50 Hoberg-Phillips Product-Market Industries 
This table shows the relationship between acquisition announcement abnormal returns 
and the organizational form of the target firm for the subsample where information was 
available on the acquirer’s product-market cluster as described in Hoberg and Phillips 
(2010).  All regression specifications contain industry and year fixed effects.  Industry 
categories are based on product-market clusters with 50 categories.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level.  P-values are included in parentheses.  ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 All Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Intercept 3.71  3.00  3.16  
 (0.17)  (0.27)  (0.24)  
Public Target Indicator -2.96 ***     
 (0.00)      
Private Target Indicator   1.02 ***   
   (0.00)    
Subsidiary Target Indicator     1.18 *** 
     (0.00)  
Small Firm Indicator 1.06 *** 1.41 *** 1.68 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Relative Deal Size  1.24 *** 0.86 ** 0.75 * 
 (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.06)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 6,111  6,111  6,111  






Shareholder Value Creation 
 Coase’s theory of the firm proposes that diminishing marginal returns to 
management determine the optimal scope of the firm at the point where the marginal cost 
of internal coordination is equal to that of obtaining the input from the external market.  In 
this framework, firms that are smaller than the optimal size for their business can obtain 
greater efficiency gains by acquisitions than their peers larger than the optimal size.   
 In exploring how the impact of acquirer size on shareholder gains reflects expected 
productivity differences among small and large acquirers, I consider three measures: excess 
payment for the target over the fair market value of its net assets, changes in operating 
return on assets, and changes in sales growth in the two postmerger fiscal years relative to 
the two premerger fiscal years.  Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) document that 
large acquirers pay higher deal premiums for their targets than small acquirers.  They posit 
that such overpayment implies greater managerial hubris at large firms and leads to less 
efficient acquisition decisions, and lower announcement abnormal returns.  Deal premium 
is measured as the total deal value relative to the market capitalization of the target firm 50 
days before the announcement.  This information is only available for public targets hence 
the evidence is limited public target acquisitions.   
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I introduce a different measure:  goodwill incurred from the acquisition in proportion to 
total deal value.  FASB rules require acquirers to record excess payment over the fair value 
of net assets, as goodwill. Estimation of fair market values, and recording the excess as 
goodwill, is subject to stringent audit requirements, hence accounting for a large fraction 
of the compensation as goodwill implies a substantial target premium.  Goodwill 
information is not available at the transaction level, thus as a proxy, I use the change in the 
acquirer’s goodwill (less goodwill impairments and goodwill amortization) in the effective 
fiscal year of the acquisition as a proxy.  Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) report that 
frequent acquirers often make several acquisitions with substantially different deal 
characteristics within the same fiscal year.  In order to avoid the ambiguity caused by 
multiple acquisitions, I restrict empirical tests on this measure of the target premium to the 
sample of acquirers that made a single deal per fiscal year.  I gauge operating efficiency 
gains from the acquisition by the change in average operating return on assets and average 
sales growth in the two years that follow the effective fiscal year of the merger relative to 
the two years that precede it.   
 Table 8 shows the summary for the overall sample and subsamples of small and 
large acquirers.  Univariate tests report that small acquirers pay lower premiums for their 
targets and they exhibit better asset utilization and sales growth in the two postmerger years 
relative to the two premerger years than large acquirers opening the possibility that the size 
effect in shareholder gains is related to higher productivity gains.  In contrast to the 
univariate differences, multivariate regressions in Tables 9 and 10 refute the hypothesis 
that the effect of acquirer size on shareholder gains is significantly related to differential 
changes in postmerger productivity:  once we control for the magnitude of the investment 
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and acquirer size, the coefficients on postmerger improvements in operating efficiency and 
sales growth are insignificant.   
 All regression models in Tables 9 and 10 include industry and time fixed effects 
and report standard errors clustered by acquirer.  Column (1) demonstrates that excess 
payment appear to have a significant negative effect, while improvements in economic 
efficiency appear to have a significant positive impact on shareholder gains if we do not 
control for relative deal size.  However, column (2) reports that controlling for relative deal 
size absorbs the impact of operating synergies and decreases the significance of the target 
premium.  While the positive market reaction to acquisitions of private and subsidiary 
targets reflects that these investments generally improve operating performance, the scope 
of attainable efficiency gains is determined by the magnitude of the investment.  Column 
(3) shows the regressions without controlling for the target premium and synergy measures 
in order to evaluate the association between the impact of acquirer size vis á vis the impact 
of productivity improvements.  The results document that the significance and magnitude 
of the coefficient on acquirer size is not materially affected by inclusion or omission of 
control variables for operating synergies and the fit of the regression remains unchanged, 
consequently the effect of firm size on shareholder gains is independent from the target 
premium and differences in operating synergies. 
 Table 10 shows that these results are robust to using 50 industry clusters based on 
product-market similarities as described in Hoberg and Phillips (2010) rather than the 





   
 
Short Selling Constraints 
Acquirer Size and the Cost of Short-Selling 
 The relationship between acquirer size on shareholder gains in acquisitions of 
private and subsidiary targets is persistent over time and industries, but it is independent 
from differences in fundamental value creation.  The alternative explanation posits that the 
effect of firm size reflects a persistent distortion in the short-term abnormal returns 
surrounding the acquisition announcement.  
 In the Miller (1977) model, limitations on short sales impact the way disagreement 
among traders is reflected in the equilibrium price: since traders with pessimistic valuations 
are not able to profit from their analysis by selling the shares short, riskier stocks 
surrounded by greater disagreement are bid up to higher prices.  Such mispricing can reach 
a higher level if irrational noise traders are also present and they take bullish positions on 
the basis of the positive news (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990)). 
 Small firms’s shares have greater idiosyncratic volatility, lower liquidity, lower 
institutional ownership, and more information asymmetry than large firms.  All of these 
factors present impediments to short-selling.  Idiosyncratic volatility has been shown to 
have the strongest association with limited short-selling as arbitrageurs are dissuaded by 
the possibility that an adverse price movement during the holding horizon will eliminate 
their profits (Pontiff (1996) and (2006)).  Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) model the 
inherent asymmetry in arbitrage:  arbitrageurs are more reluctant to take positions in high 
idiosyncratic volatility stocks when these are overpriced due to the maintenance margin 
requirement:  if a price increase takes place during the horizon of the arbitrage transaction, 
arbitrageurs need to react immediately by increasing the capital tied up in the margin.    
34 
 
   
 
 Motivated by these theories and the supporting empirical evidence, I employ 
idiosyncratic volatility as the proxy for short-selling constraints to test the hypothesis that 
market frictions are responsible for the effect of acquirer size on shareholder gains.  
Following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) I calculate idiosyncratic volatility as the 
standard deviation of daily abnormal returns over those predicted by the Fama-French three 
factor model. Parameter estimates for calculating abnormal returns are based on annual 
Fama-McBeth regressions of daily returns on market returns with standard errors clustered 
at the firm level.  Median idiosyncratic volatility is 2.28% for the overall sample, 3.24% 
for small acquirers, and 2.08% for large acquirers.  I sort acquirers into high and low 
idiosyncratic risk categories based on whether the idiosyncratic volatility of their shares 
exceeds the median in the sample.     
 Tables 11-14 show comparisons of three-day cumulative abnormal announcement 
returns, cumulative reversal in the twenty-two trading days following the announcement 
period, three-day abnormal trading turnover, and short interest outstanding in the month of 
the announcement by the idiosyncratic volatility of the acquirer and firm size.  I find 
statistically significant differences among acquirers with high and low idiosyncratic 
volatilities along all of these dimensions. 
 Table 11 reports that acquirers with high idiosyncratic volatility have significantly 
greater abnormal returns than their peers both in the overall sample and within the 
subsamples of small and large acquirers.  I find that the majority of small acquirers (73.5%) 
has high idiosyncratic volatility, whereas the majority of large acquirers (58.5%) has low 
idiosyncratic volatility as benchmarked against the sample median.  Acquirers in the high 
idiosyncratic volatility group experience substantially greater three-day cumulative 
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abnormal announcement returns than acquirers in the low idiosyncratic volatility group, 
regardless of their size. 
 Table 12 presents cumulative reversals in the twenty-two trading days following 
the event.  I find substantial negative reversals in all categories corroborating the behavioral 
finance literature (e.g. DeBondt and Thaler (1985)) that investors overreact to news.  
Acquirers with high idiosyncratic volatility experience greater reversals than acquirers with 
low idiosyncratic volatility in all size groups.  Taken together, greater abnormal 
announcement returns and larger postannouncement reversals lead to the conclusion that 
the impact of acquirer size on shareholder gains reflects larger market overreaction in the 
case of small acquirers.   
 I conjecture that the greater market overreaction arises from stronger price pressure.  
Small stocks are less liquid than large stocks (e.g. Amihud (2002)), hence the increase in 
demand associated with the positive news conveyed by the acquisition of a private or 
subsidiary target will generate greater abnormal trading volume.  Greater increase in 
demand together with short-selling constraints will result in bidding up the stock price of 
small acquirers to a higher level.   
 Table 13 documents three-day cumulative abnormal trading turnover around the 
announcement1 measured as the cumulative residuals in the three event days over predicted 
trading volume. Prediction parameters are based on the preceding 12-month period 
following Bamber (1987).  Trading turnover is calculated as the ratio of daily shares 
volume (divided by half) to the total number of shares outstanding.  The announcement 
generates significantly greater abnormal trading turnover for acquirers whose idiosyncratic 
                                                          
1 Note:  trading turnover information was missing for 110 observations in the CRSP volume data, so these 
transactions are not included in the comparisons in Panel C of Table 4.   
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risk is above the group median than those below the group median in all categories.  Small 
acquirers experience greater abnormal trading turnover than large acquirers, which 
corresponds to the underlying associations between size, idiosyncratic risk, and illiquidity. 
 Short-selling constraints cannot be measured directly by the actual outstanding 
short interest, as short interest that would prevail in the absence of all short-selling 
constraints is unobservable, even though we expect that short-selling constraints and actual 
short positions are negatively related.  Table 14 confirms stocks with high idiosyncratic 
volatility have significantly lower short interest outstanding in the month of the acquisition 
than stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility in all categories.  It is important to note that 
the Compustat file provides monthly (or in recent years biweekly) reported short interest:  
the number of shares that are in outstanding short positions.  Blau, Van Ness, and Van Ness 
(2011) show that the correlation between the outstanding short interest and short trading 
volume is only 45%.   
 Altogether greater abnormal trading turnover and lower short interest indicate a 
greater buying pressure in the case of acquirers whose shares are costlier to sell short, 
confirming the relationship between short-selling constraints and greater market 
overreaction to positive news.  These results support the hypothesis that the impact of 
acquirer size on shareholder gains in corporate acquisitions results from limits to arbitrage 
rather than a greater scope of shareholder value creation in firms below the optimal size. 
 
Shareholder Gains, Acquirer Size, and Idiosyncratic Risk 
 The univariate results support a limits-to-arbitrage explanation of the relationship 
between acquirer size and announcement abnormal returns.  To explore this argument in 
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more detail, I conduct multivariate regressions with controls for other determinants of 
shareholder value creation.    
 Tables 15 and 16 discuss determinants of shareholder gains in acquisitions of 
private and subsidiary targets.  Table 15 contains multivariate regressions of shareholder 
gains on acquirer size and relative deal size with and without controlling for the proxy for 
the short-selling cost of the shares of the acquiring.  All regressions contain time and 
industry fixed effects and report standard errors clustered by the acquiring firm.  The 
coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility as the proxy for costly short sales subsumes the 
coefficient of acquirer size on shareholder gains, implying that the impact of acquirer size 
on abnormal returns originates from limits to arbitrage.  Table 16 confirms that these results 
are robust to using a flexible industry categorization based on textual analysis of product 
market similarities (Hoberg and Phillips (2010)) rather than the 48 Fama-French industries 
based on the primary SIC or NAICS code of the firm.  In Table 17, idiosyncratic volatility 
of the shares of the acquirer as a proxy for short-selling costs is replaced by the actual 
volume of short interest outstanding in the month of the acquisition announcement.  The 
coefficient on the actual short-selling volume is insignificant in the regression.    
 Table 18 and 19 report the results of cross-sectional analysis with the full set of 
control variables.  Acquirer characteristics are measured in the beginning of the fiscal year 
of the acquisition announcement.  Excess cash refers to cash holdings over the predicted 
level for the industry and fiscal year based on macroeconomic and firm-specific variables 
following Harford (1999).  Illiquidity refers to the average Amihud measure calculated 
from monthly prices and returns in the 12 months preceding the month of the acquisition 
announcement.   Target premium refers to the fraction of total deal value recorded as 
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goodwill.  Cash transactions include those where 100% of the payment took place in cash.  
A deal is classified as a diversifying acquisition if the target belonged to a different Fama-
French 48 industry category than the acquirer based on its primary SIC code prior to the 
acquisition.  All regressions include time and industry fixed effects and report standard 
errors clustered by the acquiring firm.     
 Columns (1) and (3) show results for the subsample of acquirers where information 
is available on the target premium measured as the fraction of goodwill to the total deal 
value, because the acquirer makes a single deal in a fiscal year.  Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller (2002) document that frequent acquirers’ acquisitions often have various deal 
characteristics.  Different levels of the excess payment would lead to ambiguity in the 
measure of target premium, hence this subsample includes acquirers who made a single 
acquisition in the fiscal year.  Columns (2) and (4) show the results for the full sample of 
acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets.   
 Idiosyncratic volatility and relative deal size exert a statistically significant impact 
on shareholder gains in all specifications, while the other variables are either statistically 
insignificant in some or all of the regression specification models.  The coefficient on the 
idiosyncratic volatility of acquirer shares as the proxy for short selling limitations 
subsumes the coefficient on acquirer size.  This regularity is consistent with the 
interpretation that small acquirers experience larger abnormal announcement returns not 
because they have a greater scope for profitability improvements, but because their shares 
face costlier short sales, thus the greater buying pressure resulting from the market’s 
reaction to the positive news leads to a higher temporary overreaction by the market. 
 Table 19 shows that these results are robust to using a more flexible industry 
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categorization based on textual analysis of product market similarities (Hoberg and Phillips 
(2010)) rather than the 48 Fama-French industries based on the primary SIC or NAICS 
code of the acquiring firm.  Table 20 reports that the results are not robust to using the 
actual volume of short interest outstanding in the month of the acquisition announcement 
as the proxy for short-selling constraints.  This is not surprising in light of the fact that 
short-selling constraints differ across firms, hence actual short sale volumes do not reflect 






   
 
Table 8 
Firm Size and the Economic Efficiency of Acquisitions 
This table shows average and median differences in performance measures related to 
acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets.  Target premium is measured as the change 
in goodwill net of goodwill amortization and impairment, recorded in the effective year of 
the merger as a fraction of the total deal value.  Target premium is calculated for acquirers 
that made a single acquisition in the fiscal year to avoid ambiguity stemming from multiple 
deals with different deal characteristics in a fiscal year.  Changes in operating return on 
assets and sales growth are evaluated by the difference between the averages of the two 
postmerger and the two premerger fiscal years (thus excluding the effective fiscal year of 
the acquisition).  Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Variable 
definitions are included in the Appendix.  Values for t and z statistics (the latter in 
parentheses) reflect the two-sided difference in means test and the nonparametric equality-









Target Premium  54.5% 31.8% 67.1% -4.4 *** 
 (5.0%) (3.6%) (5.7%) (-1.7) * 
Number of Observations 4,301 762 2,718   
Changin in Operating ROA -1.4% 0.3% -1.7% 8.1 *** 
 (-0.9%) (-0.6%) (-0.8%) (4.7) *** 
Number of Observations 8,802 1,117 6,306   
Change in Sales Growth -5.1% 8.8% -7.7% 9.7 *** 
 (-1.6%) (6.1%) (-2.5%) (10.80) *** 







Shareholder Gains, Economic Efficiency, and Acquirer Size 
with 48 Fama-French Industries 
This table shows how target premium and operating synergies affect shareholder gains upon the 
announcement of the acquisition.  The sample includes acquisitions of private and subsidiary 
targets where the target premium could be calculated.  The dependent variable is the three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns over the Fama-French three-factor model in the 200-day period 
starting 205 days before the acquisition announcement. Columns (1), (2), and (3) include 
observations where the acquirer size is either small, i.e. the firm’s total assets at the beginning of 
the fiscal year of the acquisition were at or below the 40th percentile of the industry asset 
distribution, or it is large, i.e. the acquirer’s total assets were at or above the 60th percentile. 
Relative deal size is calculated as the total deal value over the acquirer’s market capitalization in 
the beginning of the fiscal year of the acquisition.  Columns (4), (5), and (6) include all 
observations.  Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Variable definitions are 
included in the Appendix.  All specifications include year and industry fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the acquirer level.  P-values are included in parentheses.  ***, ** and * 





Table 9 continued 
 
 
 Private and Subsidiary Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Intercept 7.34 *** 3.93 *** 3.82 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Target Premium  -0.08 ** -0.06 *   
 (0.04)  (0.09)    
Change in Operating ROA 3.69 * 1.62    
 (0.10)  (0.46)    
Change in Sales Growth 0.96 ** 0.46    
 (0.04)  (0.33)    
Total Assets (Log) -0.65 *** -0.27 *** -0.28 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Relative Deal Size   3.42 *** 3.53 *** 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 4,301  4,301  4,301  







Shareholder Gains, Economic Efficiency Indicators, and Acquirer Size  
 
with 50 Hoberg-Phillips Product-Market Industries 
 
 
This table shows the robustness checks for the regression models in Table 9 using 50 industry 
clusters based on product-market similarities as described in Hoberg and Phillips (2010) for the 
subsample of observations where this information is available.  The sample includes acquisitions 
of private and subsidiary targets where the target premium could be calculated.  The dependent 
variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal returns over the Fama-French three-factor model in 
the 200-day period starting 205 days before the acquisition announcement. Columns (1), (2), and 
(3) include observations where the acquirer size is either small, i.e. the firm’s total assets at the 
beginning of the fiscal year of the acquisition were at or below the 40th percentile of the industry 
asset distribution, or it is large, i.e. the acquirer’s total assets were at or above the 60th percentile. 
Relative deal size is calculated as the total deal value over the acquirer’s market capitalization in 
the beginning of the fiscal year of the acquisition.  Columns (4), (5), and (6) include all 
observations.  Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Variable definitions are 
included in the Appendix.  All specifications include year and industry fixed effects.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the acquirer level.  P-values are included in parentheses.  ***, ** and * 





Table 10 continued 
 
 
 Private and Subsidiary Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Intercept 8.18 ** 5.00  5.02  
 (0.02)  (0.14)  (0.14)  
Target Premium  -.08 * -.071 *   
 (0.05)  (0.09)    
Change in Operating ROA 3.90  2.13    
 (0.13)  (0.39)    
Change in Sales Growth 0.83  0.47    
 (0.15)  (0.42)    
Total Assets (Log) -0.59 *** -0.28 *** -0.29 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Relative Deal Size   2.98 *** 3.08 *** 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 3,455  3,455  3,455  








Announcement Abnormal Returns and Idiosyncratic Volatility 
This table reports the average and median (in parentheses) three-day cumulative abnormal 
returns in acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets for acquirers classified according 
to the idiosyncratic volatility of their shares.  CARs refer to the three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns estimated using the Fama-French three-factor model over a 200 trading 
day period starting 205 trading days before the acquisition announcement.  Small acquirers 
are those whose total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year of the acquisition were at or 
below the 40th percentile of the industry-year asset distribution in a given fiscal year, 
whereas large acquirers are those whose total assets were at or above the 60th percentile. 
Values for t and z statistics (the latter in parentheses) reflect the two-sided difference in 
means test and the nonparametric equality-of-medians test for the significance of the 
difference between the high and the low idiosyncratic volatility group.  ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
  All High IV Low IV t and z stats  
Three-Day CARs - All Acquirers 1.9% 2.7% 1.0% 9.2 *** 
 0.9% 1.7% 0.6% 8.4 *** 
Number of Observations 6,933 3,422 3,511   
Three-Day CARs - Small Acquirers 3.8% 4.9% 2.8% 3.0 *** 
 1.7% 2.8% 1.4% 2.0 ** 
Number of Observations 981 462 519   
Three-Day CARs - Large Acquirers 1.3% 1.9% 0.8% 5.5 *** 
 0.7% 1.3% 0.5% 5.3 *** 







Abnormal Return Reversals and Idiosyncratic Volatility 
This table reports the average and median (in parentheses) cumulative abnormal returns for 
twenty-two trading days starting on the second trading day that follow the acquisition 
announcement.  Values for t and z statistics (the latter in parentheses) reflect the two-sided 
difference in means test and the nonparametric equality-of-medians test for the significance 
of the difference between the high and the low idiosyncratic volatility group.  ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Idiosyncratic volatility 
is measured as the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns over those predicted by the 
Fama-French 3 factor model in the 200 trading day period ending six trading days before 
the acquisition announcement. Parameters are estimated from annual Fama-McBeth 
regressions with standard errors clustered at the firm level.  High idiosyncratic volatility 
acquirers are those whose standard deviation of daily abnormal returns was greater than 
the group median of 2.28% for the overall sample, 3.24% for small acquirers, or 2.07% for 
large acquirers.  Low idiosyncratic volatility acquirers are those whose idiosyncratic 
volatility was at or below the median.   
 
 
 All High IV Low IV t and z 
stats 
 
Twenty Two-Day CAR Reversals - All  -1.8% -2.8% -0.9% -5.6 *** 
 -1.1% -2.4% -0.5% -5.5 *** 
Number of Observations 6,787 3,359 3,428   
Twenty Two-Day CAR Reversals - Small  -2.7% -5.0% -0.8% -4.1 *** 
 -1.9% -4.6% -1.0% -4.0 *** 
Number of Observations 971 457 514   
Twenty Two-Day CAR reversals - Large  -1.5% -2.2% -0.9% -3.5 *** 
 -0.9% -1.7% -0.5% -3.2 *** 







Announcement Abnormal Trading Turnover and Idiosyncratic Volatility 
This table reports the average and median (in parentheses) three-day cumulative abnormal 
trading turnover in acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets for acquirers classified 
according to the idiosyncratic volatility of their shares.  Trading turnover is calculated as 
the ratio of daily shares volume (divided by half) to the total number of shares outstanding.   
Three-day abnormal trading turnover is measured following Bamber (1987) as the 
cumulative residuals from the predicted trading turnover winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.     Predicted trading turnover  is  calculated on the basis of monthly regressions  
of the daily turnover on the market turnover in the  12  months preceding the month of  the 
announcement.  Market turnover is measured by the equally weighted average turnover of 
all CRSP stocks on a given day.  Values for t and z statistics (the latter in parentheses) 
reflect the two-sided difference in means test and the nonparametric equality-of-medians 
test for the significance of the difference between the high and the low idiosyncratic 




 All High 
IV 
Low IV t and z 
stats 
 
Abnormal Trading Turnover - All  30% 39% 21% 8.0 *** 
 16% 25% 10% 7.5 *** 
Number of Observations 6,803 3,352 3,451   
Abnormal Trading Turnover - Small  57% 81% 37% 6.2 *** 
 40% 77% 22% 6.3 *** 
Number of observations 952 448 504   
Abnormal Trading Turnover - Large  22% 28% 16% 5.5 *** 
 12% 16% 8% 4.7 *** 







Short Interest and Idiosyncratic Volatility 
This table reports the average and median (in parentheses) short interest in acquisitions of 
private and subsidiary targets for acquirers classified according to the idiosyncratic 
volatility of their shares.  Short interest is measured as the ratio of short positions to the 
total number of shares outstanding in the month of the acquisition announcement calculated 
from Compustat. Values for t and z statistics (the latter in parentheses) reflect the two-sided 
difference in means test and the nonparametric equality-of-medians test for the significance 
of the difference between the high and the low idiosyncratic volatility group.  ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 All High IV Low IV t and z 
stats 
 
Short Interest - All Acquirers 20.3% 16.6% 23.8% -20.5 *** 
 13.3% 8.3% 28.4% -19.1 *** 
Number of Observations 6,933 3,422 3,511   
Short Interest - Small Acquirers 21.6% 17.6% 25.2% -8.0 *** 
 17.8% 8.6% 29.7% -7.7 *** 
Number of Observations 981 462 519   
Short Interest - Large Acquirers 19.8% 15.6% 23.8% -19.6 *** 
 12.9% 7.3% 29.0% -18.0 *** 












The Effect of Idiosyncratic Risk on Shareholder Gains  
       with 48 Fama-French Industries 
The table shows how acquirer size and idiosyncratic volatility affect shareholder gains in 
acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets.  The dependent variable is three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns over the Fama-French three-factor model in the 200-day 
period starting 205 days before the acquisition announcement. Columns (1) and (2) include 
observations where the acquirer size is either small, i.e. the firm’s total assets at the 
beginning of the fiscal year of the acquisition were at or below the 40th percentile of the 
industry-year asset distribution, or it is large, i.e. the acquirer’s total assets were at or above 
the 60th percentile. Columns (3) and (4) include all observations and measure acquirer size 
by the log of the firm’s total assets.  Relative deal size is calculated as the total deal value 
over the acquirer’s market capitalization in the beginning of the fiscal year of the 
acquisition.  Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Variable definitions 
are included in the Appendix.  All specifications include year and industry fixed effects.  
Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer level.  P-values are included in parentheses.  




 Private and Subsidiary Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Intercept 1.70  0.82  3.83 *** 1.72  
 (0.15)  (0.51)  (0.00)  (0.23)  
Idiosyncratic Risk   44.75 ***   48.41 *** 
   (0.01)    (0.00)  
Small Acquirer Indicator 0.89 *** 0.36      
 (0.01)  (0.36)      
Total Assets (Log)     -0.26 *** -0.10  
     (0.00)  (0.16)  
Relative Deal Size 3.17 *** 2.87 *** 3.26 *** 3.04 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 5,723  5,723  6,933  6,933  










The Effect of Idiosyncratic Risk on Shareholder Gains  
       with 50 Hoberg-Phillips Product Market Industries 
This table reports the analysis in Table 15 using 50 product market industry categories as 
in  Hoberg and Phillips (2010) where information is available on the product market 
industry applicable to the acquiring firm. 
 
 
 Private and Subsidiary Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Intercept 3.01  2.13  5.02 * 3.37  
 (0.35)  (0.46)  (0.06)  (0.21)  
Idiosyncratic Risk   37.94 ***   35.57 *** 
   (0.01)    (0.01)  
Small Acquirer Indicator 0.87 * 0.31      
 (0.01)  (0.52)      
Log of Total Assets     -0.24 *** -0.12  
     (0.00)  (0.11)  
Relative Deal Size 2.79 *** 2.51 *** 3.01 *** 2.85 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 4,725  5,723  5,750  5,750  











Announcement Abnormal Returns, Acquirer Size, and Short Interest 
This table repeats the analysis in Table 15 using the average volume of short interest 




 Private and Subsidiary Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Intercept 1.69  1.82  3.83 *** 4.01 *** 
 (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Short Interest Outstanding   -0.03    -0.04  
   (0.29)    (0.11)  
Small Acquirer Indicator 0.89 *** 0.89 ***     
 (0.01)  (0.01)      
Total Assets (Log)     -0.26 *** -0.26 *** 
     (0.00)  (0.00)  
Relative Deal Size 3.17 *** 3.17 *** 3.26 *** 3.26 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 5,723  5,723  6,933  6,933  










Cross-sectional Analysis of Announcement Abnormal Returns 
with 48 Fama-French Industries 
The table shows the impact of acquirer size and idiosyncratic volatility on shareholder 
gains in acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets in regressions employing the full set 
of control variables shown to matter in event studies on corporate acquisitions.  The 
dependent variable is three-day cumulative abnormal returns over the Fama-French three-
factor model in the 200-day period starting 205 days before the acquisition announcement. 
Columns (1) and (2) include observations where the acquirer size is either small, i.e. the 
firm’s total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year of the acquisition were at or below the 
40th percentile of the industry-year asset distribution, or it is large, i.e. the acquirer’s total 
assets were at or above the 60th percentile. Columns (3) and (4) include all observations 
and measure acquirer size by the log of the firm’s total assets.  Relative deal size is 
calculated as the total deal value over the acquirer’s market capitalization in the beginning 
of the fiscal year of the acquisition.  Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
Variable definitions are included in the Appendix.  All specifications include year and 
industry fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer level.  P-values are 











Table 18 continued 
 
 Private and Subsidiary Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Intercept 0.74  1.02  0.99  1.93  
 (0.59)  (0.43)  (0.52)  (0.18)  
Idiosyncratic Risk 64.85 *** 42.70 *** 75.47 *** 49.14 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Small Firm Indicator 0.02  0.37      
 (0.90)  (0.38)      
Total Assets (Log)     -0.03  -0.10  
     (0.78)  (0.14)  
Market to Book -0.08 ** -0.04  -0.05  -0.03  
 (0.04)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.34)  
Acquirer Leverage  -0.07  0.43  -0.12  0.15  
 (0.95)  (0.56)  (0.89)  (0.81)  
Acquirer Excess Cash  -0.62  -0.32  -1.27  -0.88  
 (0.63)  (0.73)  (0.25)  (0.28)  
Illiquidity 0.10  0.06  0.08  0.05  
 (0.59)  (0.68)  (0.64)  (0.71)  
Relative Deal Size 2.50 *** 2.65 *** 2.85 *** 2.83 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Target Premium  -0.06    -0.06    
 (0.14)    (0.14)    
Change in operating ROA 1.60  -0.53  0.58  -0.22  
 (0.53)  (0.78)  (0.80)  (0.90)  
Change in Sales Growth 0.36  0.31  0.61  0.42  
 (0.57)  (0.37)  (0.23)  (0.41)  
Cash Payment 0.08  -0.09  0.15  -0.02  
 (0.76)  (0.64)  (0.54)  (0.91)  
Diversifying -0.14  0.00  -0.20  -0.09  
 (0.67)  (0.99)  (0.48)  (0.69)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 3,480  5,723  4,301  6,933  











Cross-Sectional Analysis of Announcement Abnormal Returns  
with 50 Hoberg-Phillips Product-Market Industries 
This table repeats the analysis in Table 18 using 50 product market industry categories as 
in  Hoberg and Phillips (2010) where information is available on the product market 
industry applicable to the acquiring firm. 
 
  
 Private and Subsidiary Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Intercept 1.38  2.44  2.53  3.67  
 (0.70)  (0.36)  (0.44)  (0.15)  
Idiosyncratic Risk 73.4 *** 46.14 *** 73.02 *** 46.06 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Small Firm Indicator 0.26  0.54      
 (0.61)  (0.19)      
Total Assets (Log)     -0.08  -0.11  
     (0.43)  (0.11)  
Market to Book -0.39  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  
 (0.76)  (0.83)  (0.93)  (0.83)  
Acquirer Leverage  -0.35  0.59  -0.13  0.35  
 (0.74)  (0.42)  (0.88)  (0.58)  
Acquirer Excess Cash  0.31  0.42  -0.81  -0.33  
 (0.82)  (0.64)  (0.48)  (0.68)  
Illiquidity -0.14  -0.16 * -0.14  -0.17  
 (0.28)  (0.10)  (0.25)  (0.07)  
Relative Deal Size 2.40 *** 2.60 *** 2.82 *** 2.95 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Target Premium  -0.06    -0.06    
 (0.11)    (0.13)    
Change in operating ROA 0.29  0.27  1.67  0.06  
 (0.32)  (0.89)  (0.51)  (0.97)  
Change in Sales Growth 0.53  0.24  0.73  0.34  
 (0.49)  (0.35)  (0.23)  (0.25)  
Cash Payment 0.10  0.09  0.09  -0.10  








         
 
Table 19 continued 
 
 Private and Subsidiary Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Diversifying -0.17  -0.15  -0.16  -0.19  
 (0.62)  (0.52)  (0.59)  (0.37)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 2,773  4,725  3,455  5,750  











Short Interest and Shareholder Gains 
This table repeats the analysis in Table 15 using the average volume of short interest 
outstanding in the month of the announcement from Compustat rather than the proxy for 
short selling constraints.     
 
 
 Private and Subsidiary Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Intercept 1.91  1.90  3.98 *** 4.09 *** 
 (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.00)  
Short Interest Outstanding -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  
 (0.50)  (0.31)  (0.37)  (0.11)  
Small Firm Indicator 0.69  0.78 **     
 (0.15)  (0.05)      
Total Assets (Log)     -0.24 *** -0.25 *** 
     (0.01)  (0.00)  
Market to Book -0.04  -0.04  -0.02  -0.03  
 (0.73)  (0.56)  (0.86)  (0.62)  
Acquirer Leverage  0.10  0.47  -0.09  0.19  
 (0.92)  (0.53)  (0.91)  (0.76)  
Acquirer Excess Cash  0.22  0.34  -0.62  0.36  
 (0.87)  (0.72)  (0.59)  (0.66)  
Illiquidity 0.17  0.10  -0.16  0.10  
 (0.35)  (0.48)  (0.33)  (0.45)  
Relative Deal Size 2.81 *** 2.87 *** 3.09 *** 2.98 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Target Premium  -0.08 **   -0.07 *   










Table 20 continued 
 
 Private and Subsidiary Targets 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Change in Operating ROA 2.13  -0.12  1.42  0.28  
 (0.41)  (0.98)  (0.53)  (0.87)  
Change in Sales Growth 0.20  0.25  0.40  0.33  
 (0.75)  (0.46)  (0.41)  (0.25)  
Cash Payment -0.05  -0.16  0.01  -0.10  
 (0.95)  (0.40)  (0.95)  (0.56)  
Diversifying -0.15  -0.01  -0.18  -0.08  
 (0.65)  (0.98)  (0.52)  (0.71)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Acquirer industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 3,480  5,723  4,301  6,933  












 My dissertation documents that the negative relationship between acquirer size and 
shareholder gains in corporate acquisition events is caused by limits to arbitrage rather than 
differential growth opportunities among small and large firms.   
 The Coasian theory of the firm posits the existence of an optimal firm size at the 
level where the marginal cost of internal coordination is the same as the marginal cost of 
obtaining the input from the external market.  Coase’s theory suggests that acquisition 
announcements made by firms below the optimal size (likely small firms) generate more 
size adjusted shareholder wealth than acquisitions by firms above the optimal size (likely 
large firms) because the former have greater potential for enhancing productivity by 
growing via acquisitions.   
 Alternatively, the relationship between acquirer size and abnormal announcement 
returns can reflect persistent market frictions arising from limits to arbitrage.  Since the 
shares of small firms face greater short-selling constraints, the buying pressure in response 
to the acquisition news will bid up the price to a higher level. 
 My evidence supports the latter explanation:  differential announcement effects of 
small versus large acquirers arise in acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets perceived 








 Greater short-term shareholder gains in the case of small acquirers are accompanied 
by greater abnormal turnover and followed by larger reversals, suggesting that differential 
gains reflect greater temporary buying pressure.  In event study regressions, the effect of 
short-selling constraints proxied by the idiosyncratic volatility of the acquirer’s shares 
subsumes the effect of acquirer size signifying that the size effect is driven by differential 
limits to arbitrage.  
 The dissertation clarifies that the impact of acquirer size on shareholder gains is 
independent from the impact of overpayment for the target and postmerger efficiency 
gains.  Although small acquirers pay lower target premiums and realize greater 
improvements in postacquisition efficiency, controlling for these variables in multivariate 
regressions does not impact the magnitude and significance of the control variable on 
acquirer size.   
 The evidence is consistent with the explanation that short-selling constraints lead 
to greater market overreaction to corporate acquisitions events perceived by the market as 
good news.  Limits to arbitrage distort the formation of the efficient price by excluding 














Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the returns 
predicted by the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model 
summed in three event days starting one day before the 
announcement.  The 3-factor model parameters are 
estimated over the 200-day period starting 206 days 
before the announcement of the acquisition.   
Announcement Abnormal 
Trading Turnover 
Cumulative abnormal trading turnover summed in three 
event days starting one day before the announcement 
over the predicted turnover.  Prediction parameters are 
generated in the 12-month period preceding the month of 
the acquisition announcement, following Bamber (1987).  
Trading turnover is calculated as the ratio of daily shares 
volume (divided by half) to the total number of shares 
outstanding.   Predicted turnover is calculated in monthly 
regressions of daily turnover on the basis of the following 
model:  
    ,ln lnit i i mkt tTO TO     where market 
turnover refers to the equally weighted average turnover 
of all CRSP stocks on a given day. Cumulative abnormal 
trading turnover is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.   
Change in Operating Return 
on Assets 
The difference between the average operating return on 
assets in the two years that follow the effective fiscal year 
of the acquisition and the average operating return on 
assets in the two preceding years.  Operating return on 
assets is calculated from Compustat as {ebitda/at} and 





Diversifying Merger Indicator =1 if the acquirer's primary Fama-French 48 industry 
group is different from the target's primary Fama-
French 48 industry group.   
Excess Cash  The difference between the firm's cash holdings scaled 
by total assets and the predicted median for the Fama-
French 48 industry in the fiscal year following Harford 
(1999) and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Idiosyncratic Risk Standard deviation of the residuals in regressions of 
daily stock returns on the three Fama and French (1993) 
factors following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 
(2006) in the 200-day period ending 6 days before the 
acquisition announcement, winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles.  Parameter estimates for the predicted 
returns are obtained by annual Fama-McBeth 
regressions.  
Illiquidity Average daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar 
trading volume, following Amihud (2002).  Calculated 
from CRSP data as 1,000,000 * abs(ret) / 
abs(prc)*volume. Winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
Industry The industry grouping of the firm based on the 48 
Fama-French (1992) industry categories assigned by 
the firm's Compustat SIC code in the fiscal year. 
Log(Assets) Logarithm of the total book assets, constructed for each 
firm-year at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
Leverage Long-term debt over market capitalization in the 
beginning of the fiscal year, constructed for each firm-
year.  Calculated from Compustat as dltt / (cshpri * 
prcc_f) and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Market to book Market capitalization over the book value of total 
equity in the beginning of the fiscal year.  Calculated 
from Compustat as (cshpri * prcc_f) / ceq and 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Private Target Indicator =1 if the target is a private firm in SDC, otherwise 0. 
Public Target Indicator =1 if the target is a publicly listed firm in SDC, 
otherwise 0. 
Change in Sales Growth 
 
The difference between the average sales growth in the 
two years that follow the effective fiscal year of the 
acquisition and that in the two preceding years.  Sales 
growth is calculated from Compustat as { sale(t)/sale(t-1)-





Pure Cash Deal =1 if the transaction was financed entirely by cash 
according to SDC, otherwise 0. 
Relative Deal Size Total transaction value in SDC divided by the acquirer's 
market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal year 
from Compustat. Winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. 
Short Interest Ratio Short interest (Compustat Supplemental Short Interest 
file, item: adjusted short interest) relative to the total 
number of acquirer shares outstanding. Winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Small Firm Indicator =1 if the book value of total assets (Compustat item at) 
falls within the 40th percentiles of the distribution in the 
firm’s industry;  
=0 if the book value of total assets falls between the 60th 
and 100th percentiles of the distribution in the firm’s 
industry. 
Industry specifications follow the 48 industry 
categories in Fama and French (1997).  
Subsidiary Target Indicator =1 if the target is listed firm in SDC as a subsidiary of 
another firm, otherwise 0. 
Target Premium  Change in goodwill net of goodwill amortization and 
pre-tax goodwill impairment (Compustat items gdwl, 
gdwlam, and gdwlip) divided by the total deal value 
from SDC.  Calculated for acquisitions of private and 
subsidiary targets where the acquirer made a single 
announcement within a fiscal year.  Winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. 
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q measured as the market to book assets ratio 
following Adam and Goyal (2008) as the sum of (equity 
market capitalization + preferred stock + debt in current 
liabilities + long term debt ) over the book value of total 
assets.  Calculated from Compustat as ((prcc_f * cshpri) 
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